Preferred Indifferents
This week you're learning about "Preferred Indifferents," the Stoic concept known in Greek as "proēgmena" (roughly: things that are preferred, or that have a kind of natural priority). The idea is that things like wealth, health, and reputation are not good or bad in themselves; they are "indifferent" to your moral character. But they are not all equal either: some of them, the preferred ones, are worth choosing when you can, because they fit with natural human life. Learning this distinction changes how you relate to money and possessions: you can want them sensibly, without needing them desperately.
Passage
But it seems that all goods are equal, and that every good is to be desired in the highest degree, and that it admits of no relaxation, and of no extension. Moreover, they divide all existing things into good, bad, and indifferent. The good are the virtues, prudence, justice, manly courage, temperance, and the rest of the like qualities. The bad are the contraries, folly, injustice, and the like. Those are indifferent which are neither beneficial nor injurious, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, riches, a good reputation, nobility of birth; and their contraries, death, disease, labour, disgrace, weakness, poverty, a bad reputation, baseness of birth, and the like; as Hecaton lays it down in the seventh book of his treatise on the Chief Good; and he is followed by Apollodorus, in his Ethics, and by Chrysippus. For they affirm that those things are not good but indifferent, though perhaps a little more near to one species than to the other. For, as it is the property of the hot to warm and not to chill one, so it is the property of the good to benefit and not to injure one. Now, wealth and good health cannot be said to benefit any more than to injure any one: therefore, neither wealth nor good health are goods. Again, they say that that thing is not good which it is possible to use both well and ill. But it is possible to make either a good or a bad use of wealth, or of health; therefore, wealth and good health are not goods. Posidonius, however, affirms that these things do come under the head of goods. But Hecaton, in the nineteenth book of his treatise on Goods, and Chrysippus, in his treatises on Pleasure, both deny that pleasure is a good. For they say that there are disgraceful pleasures, and that nothing disgraceful is good. And that to benefit a person is to move him or to keep him according to virtue, but to injure him is to move him or to keep him according to vice. They also assert, that things indifferent are so spoken of in a twofold manner; firstly, those things are called so, which have no influence in producing either happiness or unhappiness; such for instance, as riches, glory, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible for a man to be happy without any of these things; and also, it is upon the character of the use that is made of them, that happiness or unhappiness depends. In another sense, those things are called indifferent, which do not excite any inclination or aversion, as for instance, the fact of a man’s having an odd or an even number of hairs on his head, or his putting out or drawing back his finger; for it is not in this sense that the things previously mentioned are called indifferent, for they do excite inclination or aversion. On which account some of them are chosen, though there is equal reason for preferring or shunning all the others.
— Diogenes Laërtius, Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Zeno 60
Reflection
Yesterday you learned the categories; today the passage sharpens the key philosophical reason wealth belongs in the 'indifferent' column rather than the 'good' one. Chrysippus and Hecaton argue: if something is truly good, it can only benefit you, never harm you. But wealth can be used well or badly; it can sharpen a generous person's generosity and a vain person's vanity. Because it depends entirely on the character of the person holding it, it cannot be a good in its own right. This is not a reason to despise wealth; the passage is equally clear that preferred indifferents 'excite inclination,' meaning it makes complete sense to want them and pursue them. The point is simply that what makes you flourish is never the possession itself but what you do with it.
Go deeper
Think of a time when having more money or resources made you, or someone close to you, act in a way you now regret: what does that episode suggest to you about where the real source of good behavior actually lives?
Practice
Trace the Outcome to Its Source
Pick one financial decision you made in the past year, good or bad. Write two or three sentences describing what actually drove the outcome: was it the amount of money involved, or the quality of your thinking and character at the moment of deciding? Be specific about which factor did most of the work.